

Approved For Release 2003/01/24 : CIA-RDP74B00776R000100130033-0

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO :
STATINTLDATE: *1 May*

FROM :

CALL SIGN -

SUBJECT:

*175. Home Sta. to Gen No.**BRIEF PLOT ON WATER & TROP SURV.**OPS BRIEF ? DICK ?**SSB ? 1400Z**call 30 ^{min} and 26.8 - ch 20**Ship Control*

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PROBLEMS ON GF 62-01

1. The problems encountered occurred with flight planning and briefing- were due to required flight planning winds arriving late, then a subsequent change in altitude profile by headquarters necessitating replanning.
2. Initial instructions in the Hq. Ops Order [] were: "Plan long range ferry profiles unless higher profile will provide more fuel remaining at high cone," (Par B 4). "select best altitude profile according to wx info providing no profile exceeds 70,000 feet" (Par E 3). Based on these instructions we flight planned for the maximum range cruise climb profile for the first leg and plus 15 for the second leg. In the GO-NO-GO message [] Hqs directed that both flights be flown at [] Plus 180 profile. This late change plus the wx coming late caused much last minute confusion.
3. The following is the schedule of events during this period:

a. Aircrew schedule

Pilot briefing scheduled at 2330L

Prebreathing scheduled at 0045L

Take off scheduled at 0200L

b. Weather schedule:

	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>RECEIVED BY FLT PLAN</u>
Enroute winds	2000L	2130L
Terminals Wx	2400L	2130L

NOTE: Planning winds arrived one hour and thirty minutes late allowing a maximum time of two hours until briefing and 45+30 to take off. Considering the necessity for flight planning both the first and second legs, with celestial, our problems were already begun. [] questioned his being able to complete and check both flight plans and still give them some celestial. We had just completed and checked the first leg and run the second leg at 2245L (0+45 before briefing) when the Hqs message arrived requiring reaccomplishing the flight plans.

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GO-NO-
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NOTE: [] I re-ran the first leg while [] worked

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on the second leg. We started taping the briefing at 0025 LCL and completed 0045L [] was approx 5 min. late on the hose). Immediately after receipt of the message I called the District phone number. [] answered the phone and informed me that all operations personnel had just gone home. He call[] and tried to relay info. but this proved unsatisfactory so [] called me. He finally agreed that we had a problem but was reluctant to make a decision. Telecon ended with his stating that if I was positive our profile was as good or better than the +18 to go ahead and fly it. Since we had to flight plan it anyhow to find out for sure we went ahead and flew the +18. Comparison is as follows:

MAX RANGE PROF

+18 PROFILE

Enroute to Hi Cone 8+06

7+55

Hi Cone Fuel 345 gals.

260 gals

b. Post briefing to T/O

Pilot prebreath 0050L

Pilot to Acft 0115L

Flight package to Acft 0145L

Take Off 0200L

NOTE: In addition to the confusion which occurred in upsetting our flight planning schedule, the following could have had adverse effects on the mission:

1. Recheck of flight plans was pushed
2. Celestial not completed
3. Pilot Briefing delayed
4. Pre-breathing delayed
5. Preparation of flight packages delayed and done hurriedly
6. A delayed T/O would have reduced [] coverage []

airborne at 2400L - Bravo and Coco would probably have been launched before getting the word)

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There are a few facts which were learned concerning the operational mission that will be discussed briefly apart from the rest of the report due to the sensitivity of this information. Maj Thornton was quite concerned over the number of people present at the briefing for the mission which was held at [redacted] ^{STAT} There were crews from the B-47, his tankers, the Article, and the entire KC-135 crew plus a very large staff. The only way in which we might be affected is the additional number of personnel who became knowledgeable of the refueling capability of the Article.

The B-47 was intercepted and aborted in accordance with briefed instructions. The driver of the Article was recalled and acknowledged but went ahead and flew out the mission. He was not intercepted insofar as the pilot knew and at least encountered no opponent opposition.

The mission was apparently a simultaneous effort involving one RB-47 equipped with precision EBT equipment and the Article flying tracks designed for a maximum response from enemy radars.

The activities of his office has not presented a challenge due to the size of the unit and the number of transactions and it is obvious that he is capable of considerably more activity.